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The Desirability of a Dollar Appreciation,
Given a Contractionary U.S. Monetary Policy
ABS TRACT
Undesirable real effects have been attributed to floating exchange
rates in general, and the 1980—83 appreciation of the dollar in particular.
In the appreciating country, the U.S., export industries lose competitiveness
and so output falls. In the other country, say Europe, the exchange rate
change worsens inflation.
This paper starts from the premise that these undesirable side effects
are attributable, not to the exchange rate, but rather to the decision
in the U.S. to switch to a more contractionary monetary policy in order
to fight inflation. Given the U.S. contraction, it might be desirable
for the dollar to appreciate in the sense that it allows each country to
attain the best possible tradeoff between aggregate output and inflation.
This conclusion follows from the assumption that in each of two sectors,
nontraded goods or exportables, the relationship between output and inflation
is concave. A U.S. contraction will then give the maximum reduction in
inflation per lost output only if it is shared equally by both sectors.
This means allowing the currency to appreciate; under a fixed exchange rate
the burden of contraction would be borne disproportionately by the nontraded
goods sector. The exchange rate change is also good for Europe. Given
the U.S. contraction, the European export sectors would suffer a dispropor-







The great rise in the value of the dollar against virtually all foreign
currencies during 1980—82 has brought forth protests from all sides. In the
United States, firms that produce for export or that compete with imports
have lost competitiveness. Output in these industries has declined in conse-
quence. In Europe,1 prices of traded goods have gone up. The Europeans'
struggle against inflation has been endangered, and they have thus felt
obliged to contract their economies. All this——an exacerbated recession at
home and alienated allies abroad-—due to an exchange rate that appears to
be far out of equilibrium.
Exchange rates have seen similar fluctuations since 1973. But for the
first time, more than a few American economists are joining those in the
media, business and government, who seriously question the floating rate
system. Rudiger Dornbusch (1982, p. 4) believes that "exchange rates in the
1970s have not worked well." C. Fred Bergsten (1982, P. 1) argues that
"massive currency misaligrtments are distorting international trade and capital
movements. The dollar is overvalued by at least 20 per cent, on average....
These Imbalances. ..addsignificantly to national growth problems, both in
countries with overvalued currencies (which suffer competitive losses) and
countries with undervalued currencies (which are driven to adopt restrictive
monetary policies)." There are really two steps to the argument, first that
the exchange rate swings are not due to economic fundamentals, and second that
they have harmful real effects. While almost no one is seriously urging an
early return to fixed exchange rates, the new skepticism toward floating entails
a renewed interest in foreign exchange intervention and capital controls.
The first point to make is that we have a good idea why the dollar has
been so strong over the last three years. By the end of 1979, public concern
with high levels of U.S. inflation had reached a near—panic state. One2
might say that the political consensus had swung infavor of a willingness
to suffer a recession in order to bring down inflation. In any case,the
Federal Reserve Board under Chairman Paul Volcker began a strict programof
monetary restraint: slow money growth and consequent highreal interest rates.
With the support of the administration elected a year later, the Fedstuck to
that program for three years.
All our models tell us that a monetary contraction causes an appreciation
of the currency, whether it is the Mundell—Fleming model with imperfect
capital mobility, the Dornbusch and Frenkel monetary models, orthe Branson—
Henderson—Kouri portfolio—balance model. It is true that the existing
theoretical models of exchange rate determination have some conflicting proper-
ties. It is further true that recent attempts to see which modelsfit the
data best on a monthly basis have reached the disturbing conclusionthat none
of them any longer fits the data well atall.2 But this just says that we
are going to have to be exceptionally clever with oureconometrics if we
want to avoid such problems as structural shifts andendogeneityof other
variables. Our econometric dIffIcultIes are no reason to give up ourtheoreti-
cal knowledge, certainly not when the gross empirical facts——the1980—82 data
point——are in accordance.
The complaint that the appreciation of the dollar has been harmfulis
not as easily disposed of. Dornbusch (1982, p. 31) states theclaim in
extreme form: "There is no sensible argument that tighteningof money should
involve as a desirable side effect a loss of exports, an increase in imports
Because these side effects are undesirable, both here and abroad, we
should attempt to the maximum possible extent to immunize the world economy3
against these spillovers." But it is the position of this paper that the
appreciation of the dollar is the natural concomitant of the U.S. monetary
contraction, not just in the sense that appreciation is what we would
expect from the contraction, but in the sense that it is actually
desirable, in that welfare in the United States and in Europe is greater than
it would be under fixed exchange rates, given the contraction.
It used to be said that flexible exchange rates allowed each country
to pursue its own internal economic policy goals regardless of the policies
of its trading partners. Early Keynesian models with no capital mobility
gave the result that a floating exchange rate guaranteed complete insulation by
shutting off the trade balance. A domestic contraction, for example, would cause
the currency to appreciate, "bottling 11TV the loss of domestic output and pre-
venting any loss in foreign output. The claim of complete insulation has long
since been abandoned. Robert Mundell showed that when capital is internationally
mobile, economic disturbances are transmitted internationally, because floating
rates, though they guarantee a zero balance of payments, do not guarantee a
zero trade balance. When a domestic monetary contraction appreciates the
domestic currency, the foreign country experiences an expansion of output in
response to its improved competitiveness.3
While the literature on transmission has been extended in a variety of
directions, the analysis of the welfare effects of fixed vs. floating rates
continues to have some conspicuous holes. Everyone rediscovers Mundell's
finding that under floating rates a policy change in the United States Is
transmitted to Europe, with the implication that if Europe was previously
where they wanted to be in terms of the output—inflation tradeoff, they are4
now worse off. The world is proclaimed to be a complex interdependent system,
governments are urged to coordinate policies and avoid large exchange rate
swings, while skepticism is expressed as to the likelihood that the governments
will do so, as if they are members of a weak cartel who are fated to succumb
to the temptation of pursuing their short—term individual self—interest to
the collective detriment.
The first hole to be plugged is the simple point that just because a
U.S. disturbance would have an impact on Europe if it kept its policy variables
unchanged, it does not follow that Europe is worse off. The Europeans can
change their policy variables in response. Indeed, the Europeans have chosen
to meet the U.S. contraction with a contraction of their own to mitigate the
large depreciation of their own currencies. This is sufficient to explain why
Europe has not experienced the expansion of the Mundell—Fleming model. The
inhibition of domestic demand for European goods caused by heightened real
interest rates has offset the stimulus to foreign demand caused by their
improved competitiveness.4 For the Europeans to have been made worse off by
the U.S. policy change, it would be necessary to argue that the terms of their
output—inflation tradeoff worsened.
But none of this answers the question whether, given a shift in U.S.
policy priorities, Europe and the United States are worse off or better off
with the change in the exchange rate than they would have been without it.
As regards U.S. welfare, this paper will argue that given the decision to
contract to fight inflation, we are better off if the currency appreciates
so that the loss in demand is felt by the export or tradable sector as well
as by the domestic or nontradable sector. While one might make an argument
for equal sharing of the pain on equity grounds, the argument made here is on5
the grounds of obtaining the best possible terms for the tradeoff between
aggregate output and aggregate inflation. As regards European welfare, the
paper will argue that, given the U.S. contraction, they too are better off
with a dollar/European exchange rate that is at least somewhat lower. Under
a fixed exchange rate, the Europeans would experience a loss in export demand.
If they do not change their own demand policy, any gain in competitiveness
will mitigate the involuntary movement down the Phillips curve (to lower out—
put) that they would otherwise experience. If they do adjust their demand
policy in response to the U.S. contraction, a lower exchange rate will still
improve their output—inflation tradeoff by improving the balance between their
export and nontraded goods sectors.
We assume that prices are sticky in the currency of the country producing
the good in question, and adjust only gradually over time to conditions of
excess supply or demandThe key assumption in deriving our results is that
the inflation/output tradeoff within each of the two sectors, domestic goods
and exportables, is concave upward. Empirical support for the concavity of
the curve lies in the familiar observation that at high levels of unemployment
and excess capacity, changes in output come more easily than changes in infla-
tion, whereas the reverse is true closer to full employment and peak capacity
utilization.5 Theoretical support for concavity lies in the rationale that the
aggregate supply curve gets its slope from neoclassical firm optimization
subject to prices that are flexible, but subject to unskilled wages (or costs
of whatever other few factors of production are variable in the short run) that
lag behind. For example, if (1) output is given by a Cobb—Douglas production
function, with y <1/2the elasticity with respect to the variable factor,
unskilled labor, (2) the firm produces where the marginal product of labor isequal to the real wage, and (3) the nominal wage is proportionate to last
period's price level, then one plus the inflation rate will be proportional
to output to the power of (lIy —1)
We will demonstrate six propositions.
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(1) TO OBTAIN THE MOST FAVORABLE TRADEOFF BETWEEN AGGREGATE INFLATION
ANDAGGREGATE OUTPUT, A COUNTRY SHOULD EXPAND EQUALLY OR CONTRACT EQUALLY IN
BOTH SECTORS.
The intuition here is that, with concave supply curves, ifthecontrac-
tion were more severe in the domestic sector than in the export sector, the
marginal reduction in inflation gained for a given further loss in output would





E output in the nontradable sector
potential output (the non—inflationary level) in that sector
the inflation rate in that sector
E output in the export sector
Epotential(non—inflationary) output in that sector
E the inflation rate in that sector
the elasticity of the price level with respect to output, assumed
greater than one (this is the concavity assumption), and for
simplicity assumed equal in all sectors. In terms of the output
elasticity with respect to unskilled wages, we can think of
as (1/i —1)
The two supply curves are illustrated in figure 1.
We will focus on the inflation rate iT measured by a producer price














Theweights are given by a =N'and 1 —a= , whereY is
aggregate potential output.
Note that if we used a consumer price index that included the price of
imported goods, instead of the producer price index,6 we would find that the
price 1evel, as opposed to the inflation rate, would fall instantaneously when
the exchange rate falls. Buiter and Miller have shown thatany gains against
inflation of this nature must be given back later when the real exchange rat2
returns to its long—run level. We would thus be in the difficult position of
having to compare the welfare effects of an unambiguous fall in the rate ofpr'.c
change versus a path that features an initial fall in the price level followed by
anincreased rate of change. It is easier to leave import prices outaltogether.
Let "a" be the share of output that is allocated to nontraded goods.
1 + =a(aY/aY)+(1-a)((l-a)Y/(l-






Thus the country should allocate output in the same proportions between
the two sectors as at full employment. If the government is going to "put the
screws" to the construction industry, it should do the same to autos and steel.t1T
Figure 2
(1O(
The optimal output—iril lation tradeoff with a
shift in preferences
'1-v V -9
Aconsequence is that the optimal aggregate tradeoff is of the same shape
as the individual tradeoffs in the two sectors:
1 + =a(Y/Y)+ (1-
(3)
=(y/)S
It is illustrated in figure 2. We draw in upward—sloping societal indifference
curves to illustrate the preferences between inflation and output. A shift in
priority from fighting unemployment to fighting inflation is shown as a
decrease in the slopes of the indifference curves. The tangency moves down the
curve to lower levels of inflation and output.
(2) TO CONTRACT EQUALLY IN THE TWO SECTORS, A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF
EXPENDITUREMUST BE ACCO!PANIED BY AN APPRECIATION OF THE CURRENCY IN ORDER TO
SWITCH EXPENDITURE AWAY FROM EXPORTABLE GOODS.
If there were no change inthe exchange rate or otherexpenditure—switching
policies, a contraction of expenditure would be concentrated relatively more in
theoutput of non—traded goods, though it would also have some effect on the
output of exportables assuming theyenter domestic consumption. Export sales
wouldto a large extent be buoyed by foreign expenditure. If output is to fall
equiproportionatelyin the two sectors somepolicy like a revaluation of the
currency is necessary to switch expenditure away from exportables toward non—
traded goods. In the case of foreign expenditure, this means a shift in
demandaway fromthe export of the domestic country toward its owngoods.In
the case of domestic expenditure it means a shift in demand towards its import
good, away from its ownexportable(and a similar shift away from its non—traded
goods, which is assumed to be dominated by the other effects).10
We wish to keep output in the two sectors in the same proportions, as we




A E domestic expenditure, determined by policy
A* E foreign expenditure, determined by policy
x the share of domestic expenditure falling on the exportable good
x E the share of foreign expenditure falling on the domestic exportable
n the share of domestic expenditure falling on the nontraded good, and
E the exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency per unit
of foreign currency.
x ,xand n are all increasing functions of the exchange rate. In the
case of x and n ,ifthe exchange rate increases, i.e. the domestic
currency depreciates, domestic consumers substitute away from the importable
good, since its price goes up in terms of domestic currency. In the case of
x* ,foreignconsumers substitute away from the domestic Importable as well
as from their own nontraded good, since the price of the domestic exportable
falls in terms of foreign currency.
Output in the two sectors is determined by demand:
=x(E)A+ x*(E)A* =n(E)A. (5)
So our condition (4) is














=(x'A+ x*'A*)/ —(xA+ x*A*)n'/n2A
—x*A*/nA2
where x ,x'and n' are the positive derivatives with respect to E
This expression will be positive if
(x'A + x*'A*) —(xA+ x*A*) n'/n> 0 . (7)
Intuitively the question is whether an increase in E raises the numerator
of (6) more than the denominator; we already know that an increase in A
does the reverse.
Using (6) in (7), the question is whether
x'A + x*'A* >
1 -an'A . (8)
Define the elasticity of domestic demand for nontraded goods C E n'AIYN
the elasticity of domestic demand for exportables x'A/wYx ,andthe
elasticity of foreign demand for exportables x*'A*/(l —w)Y
,where
w is whatever share of Y happens to be sold to domestic consumers. Then
our condition is
cxW + c(l -w)Yx
>aC nN
Using(4),
+c(l —w)> C . (9)12
Thus the question comes down simply to whether a weighted average of the
domestic and foreign elasticities of demand for the exportable exceeds the
elasticity of demand for nontraded goods.
We cannot prove that (9) holds, but it seems likely. It says that
exportables are closer substitutes for the importable good whose price has
changed than are nontraded goods. It is often observed that countries tend
to trade similar products.A common model, sometimes called the dependent
economy model, even assumes that exportables and importables are perfect
substitutes. We shall simply assume condition (9). The reader may find the
proposition that a devaluation shifts relative expenditure into exportable
goods, and that a revaluation shifts relative expenditure out of exportable
goods, sufficiently obvious that Proposition (2) can be taken directly.
As long as (9) holds, there will exist some size decline in the exchange
rate that will allocate a decline in U.S. expenditure in the desired equal pro-
portions between the two sectors. Of course there is no guarantee that thesize
of the decline in the dollar/European exchange rate that actually takes place
WIll be of the correct magnitude. It depends obviously on what kind of
exchange rate model is assumed and what parameter values. But it also depends
on what is done with other policy variables besides expenditure A .First,
we must allow for the foreign country responding by changing its level of
expenditure A* .Second,we must recognize that either government can
and does affect the exchange rate. In a portfolio—balance model, the central
banks can intervene on the foreign exchange market to affect the exchange
rate without changing the money supply. In a monetary model,la Mundell—
Fleming, Dornbusch (1976) or Buiter—Miller, the government can affect theexchange rate by varying the monetary/fiscal policy mix, even if effective
sterilized foreign exchange intervention is precluded by the assumption of
pure floating, or of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
bonds.
If the domestic country were small, so that it alone cared about its
exchange rate, we might content ourselves with the observation that it can
obtain the optimum outcome by the proper revaluation, if it so desires. But
the necessity to consider the policy options of the rest of the world inspire
us to consider some further propositions, beginning with the welfare effects
of a decrease in the exchange rate that is smaller than the optimum.
(3)WHEN IT REDUCES EXPENDITURE IN ORDER TO FIGHT INFLATION, EVEN IF
THE COUNTRY IS CONSTRAINED FROM DISCRETELY DECREASING THE EXCHANGE RATE, IT
IS STILL TRUE THAT AN INCREMENTAL DECREASE IN THE EXCHANGE RATE (APPRECIATION)
WILL IMPROVE ITS WELFARE.
The basic intuition here is the same as for Proposition (2): under a
fixed exchange rate the reduction in expenditure falls disproportionately on
non—traded goods, so that an incremental appreciation to shift expenditure
away from exportable goods moves the economy closer to a balanced contraction.
The situation is illustrated by Figure 3. The optimal tradeoff pictured in
Figure 2 held when the country was free to vary both E and A at will. If
the country is constrained from varying E ,itwill necessarily have a less
attractive opportunity set. We assume that we start from a point 0 on the
optimal tradeoff curve, where output in the two sectors is proportional to
their full—employment capacities, and that the exchange rate is then fixed at
13Figure 3




that level. Now society's indifference curves shift. With E fixed, the new
optimal tangecy point P is no longer attainable, and the economy must settle
for the tangency with a more concave constrained tradeoff, at Q.Sincethe
constrained tradeoff is flatter at low levels of output, Q lies above and to
the right of P .Anincremental decrease in E will incrementally lower
ir and Y ,whichis a movement southwestward, so it seems likely that this
will improve welfare. But the proposition needs to be proven.
We repeat equations (5)
=x(E)A+ x*(E)A* "RN =n(E)A (5)
We substitute them into equation (2) for aggregate inflation, and the equation
=N+foraggregate output, to see how these variables depend on E
and A
1 + =[n(E)A/YNJ÷(1-a)[(x(E)A+ x*(E)A*)/YxJ (10)
Y =n(E)A+ x(E)A + x(E)A*
We are interested in the slope of the constrained curve in Figure 3, the terms







At points of tangency like 0 and Q, theslope is equal to society's
marginal rate of substitution between ir and Y .Thereis no way to know
what the society indifference curves look like, even whether they are convex
or concave. We assume for simplicity that they are linear, that welfare
W is given by
W: c(Y/Y) —d(l+ ir) . (12)
Thus the marginal rate of substitution is constant7 at
dTr —W/(Y/Y)—
d(Y/Y)
Equating to the slope given by (11), and using N =aYand Y =(1—a)Y
d
n(E) + x(E)
+ [(x(E)A + x*(E)A*)IYx]1x(E)} (14)
We can see from (14) how a decrease in the slope c/d of the indifference
curves will require a reduction in the only free policy variable, A .Given
the non—linearity of equation (14), it is impossible to solve explicitly for
A Nor is it necessary to solve for A in order to demonstrate Proposition
(3). However, it will help to make things more concrete if we take a moment









We thus see explicitly how the fall in -, sayfrom [Jto [-J
causes the government to reduce A ,sayfrom A0 at 0 to A1 at P
The question is, what is the effect on welfare of an incremental decline in
E from point P ? From the expression for welfare (12),




Taking our derivatives from (10),
W(A1,E) c1 =— (n'A1+x'A1+ x*'A*)
—
dl1Iac5[n(E)Al/YNJnTAl/YN
+ (1-a) 5{(x(E)A1+ x*(E)A!YxI6l(xTAi + x*A*)/Yx}
We want to show that a decrease in E increases welfare, i.e. that the expres-
sion is negative. This will be true if




+ x*'A*From equation (14),
[--J.
isa weighted average of two terms
(a)5[n( E)Al/YN]rS
(b) 5[(x(E)A1 + x*()A*)/YxIô1





The righthandside (RHS) of (17) is a weighted average of the same two terms,
(a) and (b), with weights
n'A1




n'A1 +'A1 +x*'A* respectively.
Now x' + x*'A*/A1 >x'+x*'A*/A0because A1 <




>x(E)n'because we saw in Proposition (1) that outputs
n(E)
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This means that the ratio of the weights (l4a) and (14b) is greater than the




Again by virtue of Proposition (1), the two terms (a) and (b) would be equal
at point 0 ,i.e.with A0 substituted for A1 .(Therethe slope in
equation (14) reduces to [}= [/]_l,ascan be seen by differentiating
(3).) But since A has fallen to A1 ,bothterms have fallen, with (a)
falling by more. Thus our finding that equation (14) puts relatively more
weight on the first term (a), implies that is less than the RHS of
1
(17), which is precisely what we needed to show. This inequality was our
condition for -< 0 :an incremental fall in the exchange rate improves
welfare.
In the foregoing we have taken foreign expenditure A* as given. We now
consider the foreign country's reaction to the change in international circum-
stances.19
(4)IFTHE EXCHANGE RATEISNOT ALLOWEDTOFALL,THEFOREIGN COUNTRY
SHOULD REACTTOTHE DOMESTIC CONTRACTION BY EXPANDING ITS OWNEXPENDITURE.
Ifthere were no change in the exchange rate, the foreign country would
bear part of the burden, in the form of lost exports, of the domestic con-
traction. This fact in itself supplies one reason why the foreign country
should want its currency to depreciate: to help insulate it from an exter-
nally imposed movement down the Phillips curve. But here we begin the
analysis by seeing how the foreign country will adjust its expenditure policies.
Given the exchange rate, it will want to fight the push down the Phillips
curve by following expansionary policies.
We model the foreign country symmetrically to the domestic country.
Foreign welfare is a function of foreign income and inflation, which are in
turn functions of foreign output of non—traded goods and expott goods:
Y* =c*—— d*(l+*)
* Y*+Y* I—'Y* Y* 1
= c*N X—d*fct*—+(1—a*)---i
J (19) L J




where n*the share of foreign expenditure falling on their nontraded good
m the share of domestic expenditure falling on the foreign export
(which is of course the domestic import; m 1 —n—x)
Etheshare of foreign expenditure falling on their own exportable
(m* E 1 — — x*)
all of them decreasing functions of the exchange rate.
We assume that the foreign country is starting from a point on its optimal
output—inflation tradeoff, i.e. that output is allocated between the two
sectors in proportion to their full—employment levels
y=y*
and that the government then chooses the level of expenditure such that the
society's marginal rate of substitution between output and inflation is equal
to the terms of the tradeoff.
Analogously to equation (14),





It can be seen from equation (20) that when A falls, the foreign country
will have to raise A* if it wants to niaintain optimality.8
Figure 4 graphs the inverse dependence of foreign expenditure on
domestic expenditure. The curve might be concave or convex. In the graph
we choose to show the case where S* =2so that the relationship is linear.Figure 5:
Dependence of foreign expenditure policy
on domestic expenditure policy
Shift in Nash equilibrium when domestic







In this case we can solve explicitly for A* in terms ofA ,analogously
to equation (15):




The absolute value of the slope is almost certainly less than1.0; it is at
any rate less than m/m*
(5) GIVEN THE DOMESTIC CONTRACTION, AN INCREMENTAL DECREASE IN THE
EXCHANGERATE WILL IMPROVE FOREIGN WELFARE.
The foreigncountry is now in the converse situation from that of the
domestic country in Proposition (3). There the domesticcountry had contracted
as much as It wanted to, but the contraction was concentrated disproportion-
ately in the non—traded goods sector, so an appreciation of itscurrency was
needed. Here the foreign country has expanded as much as it wantsto, but
the expansion is concentrated disproportionately in the non—tradedgoods
sector, so a depreciation of its currency is needed. The world is indeed
lucky that both countries want the same exchange rate to move in the same
direction!
Let A be the level that foreign expenditure rises to, according to
equation (19), or its linear form (20), in response to the decrease In domestic
expenditure to A1 .Thenwe want to show that
W*(A ,A*,E) 1 1<0. (22)22
If we differentiate equation (19), we find that (22) is trueif a condition
analogous to condition (17) for the domestic countryholds:
c**[fl*(E)A*/y*]1(fl*A1+ [(m*(E)At+m(E)Al)/Y*1m*A*mAl)
d* (_n*')A + (_m*')A +(—m')A1
(23)
(Recall that the derivatives n' ,m*'and m' are negative.) From
equation (20), we know that, once the foreign countryhas raised its expendi—
c*




where the weights are






TheRHS of condition (23) is a weighted average of the same two terms,












(_n*') by the analogous version of assumption
(8) for the foreign country,
ni*(E) > —(_n*)because
n*(E)
by Proposition (1) outputs in the two sectors were originally proportionate





m*(E)A+ m(E)A0 > m*(E)A3
This means that the ratio of the weights (20a) and (20b) is greater than the





The two terms, (a*) and (b*), would be equal to each other ifA0 and A
were substituted for A1 and 4, againby Proposition (1). But since A
has decreased to A1 and A* has increased to At,thefirst term (a*) is
now greater than the second (b*). Since the relative weight on the first term
is greater in equation (20), is indeed greater than the RHS of condition
(23). Thus (22) holds: a decrease in the exchange rate raises foreign
welfare.
We originally proved Proposition (3) on the assumption that foreign
expenditure A* could be taken as given. Now that we have recognized that,24
at the given exchange rate, the foreign country will respond to the domestic
contraction by expanding its expenditure, we must take this into account.
Equation (14), and its linear form equation (15), tell us that the domestic
country, in order to achieve its desired point on the output—inflation tradeoff,
will react to the increase in A* by reducing further its own expenditure A
We could show that at this new point It is again true that domestic welfare
would benefit from an incremental fall in the exchange rate. However there is
no reason to assume that the process will stop there. Equation (20), and its
linear form equation (21), tell us that the foreign country will in turn react
to the further contraction by undertaking a further expansion. Then the domestic
country will contract further, and so on. The logical thing to do is to take up
the question when the process converges.
(6) IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY
SETTING EXPENDITURE TAKINGINTO ACCOUNT THE OTHER COUNTRY'S EXPENDITURE, AN
INCREMENTALDECREASE IN THE EXCHANGE RATE WOULD BENEFIT EACH COUNTRY.
Indeedgiven the further decreases in domestic expenditure and increases
in foreign expenditure which are necessary to reach Nash equilibrium, domestic
output becomes even more skewed away from nontraded goods than it was under
Proposition (3), so the appreciation of its currency Is even more needed; and
similarly foreign output becomes even more skewed toward nontraded goods, so
the depreciation of its currency is even more needed.
Figure (5) graphs the dependence of domestic expenditure on foreign
expenditure on the same axes as the graph showing how foreign expenditure
depends on domestic expenditure. The Nash equilibrium occurs at the intersec-
tion, point N0 .Itis clear from equation (14), or its linear form equa—tion (15), that when the domestic country's marginal rate of substitution
between inflation and unemployment, c/d,falls,its policy reaction schedule
shifts inward in Figure (5). The two countries can then be thought ofas
taking turns in adjusting their policies in reaction to each other until the
new Nash equilibrium is reached.
We can solve equations (15) and (21) algebraically for the equilibrium





( xEfl_a* ___ +m* + m 1-a m* mj 1-a
and similarly for *
Thederivation of the welfare effects proceeds along the same linesas
before. For the domestic country, because the Nash equilibrium pointrepre-
sents an optimal setting of A ,equation(14) holds with A =Aand
A* =A*.Thecondition necessary for
W(A,*,E)< o
is the same as condition (17), but with A substituted for
A1 ,andA*




,ofwhich the RHS of (14) is a weighted average
with relatively more weight on the first (14a) than the second (14b), and of
which the RHS of (17) is a weighted average with relativelymore weight on the
second (17b) than the first (17a). It follows that the inequality holds.
An appreciation benefits the domestic country.
2526
For the foreign country, because the Nash equilibrium point represents
an optimal setting of A* ,equation(20) holds with A* =A*and A A
The condition necessary for
W*(A,A*,E) <
isthe same as condition (23), but with A and A* substituted. Of the
two terms, the first is greater than the second. The RHS of (20)is a weighted
average that puts relatively more weight on thefirst (20a) than the second
(20b), and the RHS of (23) is a weighted average that puts relatively more
weight on the second (23b) than the first (23a). It againfollows that the
inequality holds. A depreciation of its currency benefitsthe foreign country.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that, given a U.S. monetary contraction, an appreciation
of the dollar is beneficial to both countries in that itallows them each to
achieve the best possible tradeoff between output and inflation.We have
chosen to concentrate on an incremental change in the exchangerate. The
finite change in the exchange rate that actually takes place could be greater
than or less than the change, described in Propositions 1 and 2,that is
optimal for the domestic country. If the actual change were largerthan the
optimal change by a wide enough margin, the countrycould theoretically be
worse off than if the exchange rate had not moved atall. But one would have
to argue that the output decline in export industriesis much greater than
the output decline in nontraded industries like housing. In the caseof the
1980—82 U.S. contraction, this does not appear to have been the case.In the only major sector that is unambiguously non—traded, construction,
output in the United States fell by 11 per cent from 1979 to 1981. In
manufacturing, by contrast, output fell by only 2 per cent. More disaggre—
gated data are available only for employment. For a set of 14 individual
industries that are the most clearly non—traded, the 1979—1981 change in
employment (1.88 per cent) was almost exactly the same as the change in
non—agricultural employment in the economy as a whole (1.91 per cent).9
We could have chosen to model explicitly the exchange rate, and each
country's level of expenditure, as functions of the countries' monetary
policies and fiscal or debt policies, in order to see the welfare effects
of the actual exchange rate change. But this approach would have complicated
the Nash equilibrium solution considerably. More importantly, the results
would have been very dependent on the particular model used. The approach
followed here, working directly in terms of the exchange rate and expenditure
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1. Throughout this paper, I will use "Europe" as shorthand for Europe, Japan
and the rest of the world.
2. Richard Meese and Kenneth Rogoff (1983) even find that models of exchange
rate determination predict more poorly out of sample than a simple
random walk.
3.See Mussa (1979) for a review of the standard results on transmission.
There are of course a number of other ways besides capital mobility
that the insulation claim can be undone. An increase in the exchange
rate will not insulate the economy from a foreign contraction if the
increase in import prices affects saving (the Laursen—Metzler effect),
the demand for money, or nominal wages or other factor costs (e.g.
through wage indexation). In this paper I abstract from these factors;
in the case of saving and money demand, my treatment of expenditure as a
policy variable accomplishes this abstraction automatically.
4. Presumably the contraction in European expenditure has not been as great
as the contraction in U.S. expenditure. This would explain the outcome
that the dollar/European exchange rate did, after all, fall. It would in
turn be explained by the observation that it was in the United States
that the fight against inflation was given increased priority; there is
no reason to assume a similar political shift in Europe as a whole.
5. For example Robert Gordon (p. 194) offers some evidence that the Phillips
curve is flat at high levels of unemployment. J. N. Fleming (p. 471)
claimed that "the inverse relationships between unemployment and price
inflation. .. aretypically curvilinear, at least in the vicinity of full
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employment. As unemployment approaches zero successive percentage
declines in unemployment must impart increasingly powerful stimuli to
Inflation." Fleming used this fact to argue that the average Phillips
curve tradeoff among a group of countries will be more favorable under
floating exchange rates than fixed exchange rates. However, this is not
the same as showing that each country Individually will be better off
under floating rates, which is the object of the present paper.
6. Or if we allowed the price of the exportable good to be determined on
world markets.
7.Even if the indifference curves are not in reality linear, the proposi-
tions derived here will be valid in the neighborhood of point 0 ,i.e.
for small policy changes (assuming of course the indifference curves are
differentiable).
8. Europe has in fact responded to the 1980—82 U.S. monetary contraction by
contracting, not expanding, as measured for example by real interest rates.
But this is what we would expect in equation (19) from the large discrete
appreciation of the dollar. If Europe did not reduce A* ,asufficiently
large fall in E would raise both and Y ,pushingEurope higher
on the inflation—output curve than desired.
9.The source for the output figures is the Economic Report of the President,
1983, Table B—li. The source for the employment figures is the Supplement
to Employment and Earnings, U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Aug. 1981 and March 1982. The 14 non—traded industries and their employ-
ment levels are given in Table 1.(Note that employment increased slightly
in both sectors, despite the fall in output and increase in the unemployment
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